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Abstract
The paper evaluates the German health care reform of 1997, using the individual num-
ber of doctor visits as outcome measure and data from the German Socio- Economic
Panel for the years 1995-1999. A number of modified count data models allow to esti-
mate the effect of the reform in different parts of the distribution. The overall effect of
the reform was a 10 percent reduction in the number of doctor visits. The effect was
much larger in the lower part of the distribution than in the upper part.
JEL Classification: I11, I18, C25
Keywords: co-payment, moral hazard, count data, probit-Poisson-log-normal model
1 Introduction
Expenditures for health services make up a substantial portion of total GDP in all OECD
countries. For most countries, health expenditures as a share of total GDP have trended
upward over the last years and decades. In Germany, for example, the share increased from
8.4 percent in 1980 to 10.5 percent in 1996 (Breyer and Zweifel, 1999). The most commonly
cited reasons for this increase are the expanding technological possibilities in the health
service sector as well as the ageing of the population, coupled in many countries with a
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Zurich. E- Mail: winkelmann@sts.unizh.ch; I am grateful to Maarten Lindeboom, Joao Santos Silva, seminar
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large public health sector where the incentive structures may not promote efficient use of
resources.
One such country with a large publicly funded health sector is Germany. There have
been regular attempts to reform the health care system in order to reduce cost. The purpose
of this paper is to evaluate the success of a major reform that took place in 1997. In that
reform, the co-payments for prescription drugs were raised by up to 200 percent. In addition,
a modified budget system imposed upper limits for reimbursements of physicians by the state
insurance.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it provides an answer to the substantive
question whether or not the health care reform of 1997 has been a success, using as outcome
measure the individual number of visits to a doctor. Second, it makes the case that in
situations such as the evaluation of health care reform, it is very important to entertain the
possibility that the reform effect may differ in different parts of the distribution. Crucial
information may thus get lost in single index models such as the Poisson or negative binomial
models. This limits their usefulness. Instead, hurdle models, among them a newly developed
probit-Poisson log-normal model, and finite mixture models offer additional flexibility. The
overall effect turns out to be quite substantial, a 10 percent reduction in the number of
doctor visits. The effect is much larger in the lower part of the distribution (for the choice
between having no visit or at least one visit) than in the upper part of the distribution (the
number of visits given at least one visit).
2 The German Health Care Reform of 1997
More than 90 percent of the German population obtains health insurance through the federal
social insurance system, a system financed mostly through mandatory payroll deductions.
For employees, the premium is proportional to earnings (up to a contribution ceiling), and
coverage automatically extends to (non-working) spouse and dependent children. Special
membership arrangements exist for other groups, such as the unemployed or students. The
insurance coverage is the same for all persons in the system. In particular, the cost of doctor
2
visits, hospital stays, and prescription drugs are not reimbursed in full but normally require
a co-payment by the user.
The focus of this paper is on co-payments for prescription drugs. Such co-payments were
increased substantially on July 1, 1997, by a fixed amount of DM 6 relative to a year earlier.
Since the absolute amount of the co-payment is a function of the package size, after the
reform DM 9 for small, DM 11 for medium and DM 13 for large sizes, the relative effect of
the 1997 reform was largest for small sizes, where it amounted to a 200 percent increase.
Social considerations resulted in a number of exemptions (co-insured children, low-income
households with family gross income under DM 1700/DM2350, maximum cumulative annual
co-payments limited to 2 percent of annual gross income; 1 percent for the chronically sick).
The change in co-payments was the most radical element of the 1997 reform. It was
reinforced by a number of additional measures that extended previously existing regulations
such as an exclusion list (Negativliste) defining drugs not covered at all by social insurance,
price ceilings related to the availability of generics, as well as a binding overall annual budget
for drugs. A further cost saving element of the 1997 reform targeted directly the provision
of physicians’ services. A quarterly budget was introduced for each doctor’s office. It was
calculated as the product of average treatment cost per patient and quarter times the number
of patients with at least one visit during the quarter. Therefore, the budget was unaffected
by the actual health condition of a patient although allowances were made for emergency
treatment.
The budget was fully transferable among patients, in recognition of the fact that the
treatment costs would average out at the level of the individual physician. Foreshadowing a
later discussion of this point, one might expect that such a budget, while possibly reducing
the intensity of treatment chosen by the doctor, might also increase the number of proposed
re-appointments. This is so because a re-appointment (for a below average cost treatment)
scheduled for a later quarter will actually increase the overall budget and allow for cross-
subsidization of above average treatment cost for other patients.
The combination of these different measures, it was hoped, would contain health care
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expenditures, or at least, its rate of increase. By definition, an increased co-payment has
a direct fiscal effect, reducing the share of the cost covered by the insurer. For instance,
the patient pays the full amount for all drugs with prices below the co-payment. Equally
important, though, it was hoped that the increased out-of-pocket expenses would raise the
awareness of the “customer” and lead to a change in attitude, reducing what has been
perceived as a partially avoidable and excessive use of prescription drugs. Co-payments
should increase the incentive to act responsibly and thereby reduce the moral hazard problem.
The following empirical analysis deals with the second aspect. It does so by focusing on
the effect of the reform on the number of doctor visits by a person during a given period of
time. This approach is chosen partly because direct information on the use of prescription
drugs is not available. In addition, there are good reasons why the increased co-payments
could have changed the demand for doctors visits (in addition to other effects of the newly
introduced quarterly budget, if any). The demand for prescription drugs and the demand
for doctor visits are closely related, and they might be complements indeed.
The 1997 reform increased the out-of-pocket expenses for prescription drugs. To obtain
a prescription, one has to see a doctor, the doctor has to fill out a prescription, and one
has to go to the pharmacy. Several responses to the price increase are possible, including
influencing the doctor to prescribe a larger package size, or not seeing a doctor at all. Both
behavioral changes would reduce the number of visits to a doctor. Alternatively, one might
still see a doctor in order to seek advice on non-prescription or self-treatment, or one might
see a doctor but decide not to buy the drug. In either case, the number of visits would tend
to be unaffected by the increased co-payment. If there is a combination of the two effects,
the number of visits will go down, and it is an empirical question to quantify the magnitude
of the overall effect.
Finally, it is worth noting that the 1997 reform enjoyed only a short lifespan. A new
coalition government led by the social democrats emerged from general elections held in
1998. The partial repeal of the 1997 reform was one of the first items on the political
agenda, and a new law lowered the co-payments by between DM 1 and DM 3, effective
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January 1, 1999. From an econometric point of view, this second reform is a fortuitous
occurrence, as it introduces an additional source of variation in the health environment that
can be used to identify individual responses.
3 A previous study
The consequences of the German health care reform of 1997 on the demand for health services
were previously assessed by Lauterbach, Gandjour and Schnell (2000). The study was based
on data collected in October - December 1998 in Cologne among visitors to pharmacies. In
order to be included in the sample, one had to be covered by the social insurance, be aged 18
or older, suffer from an acute or chronic illness, and not be exempted from the co-payment.
10,000 questionnaires were distributed and 695 returned.
The Cologne study included a number of different outcome measures. I concentrate here
on the number of visits to a doctor. Those who responded to the survey reported on average
9.2 doctor visits over the previous 12 months. 80.2 percent of all respondents said that the
health care reform had no effect on the number of visits. 8.6 percent reported that they had
“given up” one visit, while 11.2 percent said that they had “given up” more than one visit in
response to the reform. Based on this information, Lauterbach et al. estimate a reduction of
consultations by 4.5 percent. Thus, the effect of the policy change is economically substantial.
But how robust is this result? The study has a number of shortcomings that may affect
the conclusions. The sample size is small and the response rate is very low, raising the issue
of response bias. More importantly, the sampling design induces an overrepresentation of
heavy users. This is an example for so-called “on-site”, or endogenous, sampling (see Santos
Silva, 1997, for a clear discussion of this issue). Presence at a pharmacy is highly correlated
with a previous doctor visit. Hence, the inclusion in the sample depends on the outcome of
the dependent variable, and the results cannot be representative for the population at large.
Occasional users of health care services are underrepresented, and non-users are excluded
a-priori.
There are two possible responses to this problem. The first would consist of using appro-
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priate econometric techniques to correct for the endogenous sampling, effectively inferring
from the distributional form of observations conditional on visits the probability of being
included in the sample. Of course, this approach requires that the same model applies to
those observed in the sample and those not observed (the “users” and the “non-users”),
an assumption that can be questioned in the present context. Therefore, if one wants to
estimate the effect of the reform in the overall population, one needs a random sample of
the entire population, such as is provided for instance by the German Socio-Economic Panel
(GSOEP).
Details of this annual household survey are given in the next section. It offers a number
of advantages in addition to the representativeness of the sample. In particular, it gives
independent measurements of the number of doctor visits before and after reform, from
where the change can be computed. This is likely to yield a more accurate estimate than
a retrospective self-assessment of the direction of response to reform as considered in the
above study. Finally, the GSOEP contains a rich set of other socioeconomic characteristics
that can be used as control variables, and the individual number of doctor visits over time
can be modeled directly using count data models.
4 Data
The GSOEP is an ongoing annual household survey that was started in 1984 (SOEP Group
2001). For the purpose of this study, I select a period of five years centered around the year
of the reform, i.e., 1995 - 1999. The GSOEP has a few variables relating to the usage of
health service. One of them is the number of visits to a doctor during the previous 3 months.
In some earlier years, this question was asked separately for visits to a general practitioner
and visits to a specialist, separately by field. However, only the aggregate count is available
in the 1995-1999 waves. Visits to a dentist are included in the definition.
The basic empirical strategy, as detailed in the next section, is to pool the data over
the five years and estimate the effects of the reforms by comparing the expected number of
visits in 1998 and 1996 ceteris paribus, i.e., for an individual with given characteristics. The
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years 1998 and 1996 are chosen since the reform took place in mid-1997. Thus, depending on
the interview month, some 1997 observations fell before the reform and some after. Another
argument for using the longer time span is a reduced risk of bias due to timing considerations.
For instance, people might have developed an “extra-demand” for doctor visits just prior to
the reform in anticipation of the upcoming changes.
The models that will be estimated in the following sections all include a systematic
component (linear predictor) of the type
x′itβ = β0+β1ageit+β2age
2
it+β3years of educationit+β4marriedit+β5household sizeit+
β6active sportit+β7good healthit+β8bad healthit+β9self employedit+β10full-time employedit+
β11part-time employedit + β12unemployedit + β13equivalent incomeit + β96(year = 1996)it +
β97(year = 1997)it + β98(year = 1998)it + β99(year = 1999)it
The reference year is 1995. In addition, there are three dummies for the quarter in
which the interview took place (winter, fall, spring). The linear predictor will be embedded
in various alternative count data models, starting with the Poisson model. It is assumed
that the reform effect is the same for all groups of the population or, alternatively, that
the interest lies in the average response. One could allow for heterogeneous responses by
estimating the model for subgroups, or including interaction terms.
There are three general channels through which these variables can affect the demand for
doctor visits. The first is the underlying health status, the second the budget constraint, and
the third the preference formation. The health status is poorly measured in the GSOEP. In
particular, no details of current medical conditions are known. A time-consistent measure of
health over 1995-1999 is provided by a subjective self-assessment in response to the question:
“How good do you perceive your own health at current?”, with responses “very good”,
“good”, “fair”, “poor”, and “very poor”. The two best responses are classified as “good
health”, the two worst responses as “bad health”, with fair health being the reference group.
Another proxy for health is the age polynomial. Finally, engaging in “active sports” (defined
as a weekly or higher frequency) acts as a further proxy for good health, although it might
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have an additional direct effect on the demand for health services as well. Clearly, these
are only crude measures of health, and one may want to account for the possibility of
additional unobserved heterogeneity to capture any remaining health aspects, as well as
other unobserved influences.
The budget constraint is determined by income and prices. The main price variables are
the opportunity costs of a visit to a doctor which, in turn depend on education level and
employment status. The influence of insurance status cannot be modeled in any meaningful
way. The number of uninsured persons in Germany is too small to be empirically relevant,
and privately insured persons are excluded from the analysis, mainly because no systematic
information on the nature of the insurance contract is available.
Several of the variables affect more than one aspect at a time. Age, for instance, matters
for health, opportunity cost (through the effect of experience on earnings) as well as poten-
tially preferences. Similarly, education is an important factor in determining the optimal
investment in health capital (Grossman, 1972). It is not the goal of this paper to disentangle
these various transmission channels. Rather, the focus lies on the year dummies, whereas
the other right hand side variables serve as controls for any effects these variables might have
on the changes in visits over time.
5 Econometric models
5.1 Poisson model
The standard probability distribution for count data is the Poisson distribution:
P (yi|λi) = exp(−λi)λ
yi
i
yi!
(1)
where
E(yi|λi) = Var(yi|λi) = λi
In a regression model, we assume that the population is heterogeneous with covariates xi,
and λi is specified as λi = exp(x
′
iβ) where i = 1, . . . , N indexes observations in the sample.
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Let y = (y1, . . . , yN)
′ and x = (x1, . . . , xN)′. Under random sampling
P (y|x) = exp
[
−
N∑
i=1
exp(x′iβ)
]
N∏
i=1
[exp(x′iβ)]
yi
yi!
(2)
and estimation of the parameters by maximum likelihood is straightforward.
Furthermore, the reform effect, typically defined as the relative change in expected doctor
visits, can be computed as follows:
∆%(98,96) =
[
E(yi,98|x)
E(yi,96|x) − 1
]
× 100
= [exp(β98 − β96)− 1]× 100 (3)
In principle, other effects of the reform could be studied as well, such as the change in
the predicted probabilities of various counts.
Clearly, the simple Poisson model can be criticized on a number of grounds. To begin
with, it does not allow for unobserved heterogeneity. Alternative models, such as the negative
binomial model or the Poisson-log-normal model provide potentially more efficient estimators
(see e.g., Winkelmann, 2000). Secondly, it ignores the panel structure of the data. There are
up to five observations for a given person. The presence of an individual specific heterogeneity
term will invalidate the assumption of independent sampling. One can incorporate this into
estimation by using a random effects panel model. Depending on the assumptions, such
models again can be of a negative binomial or a Poisson-log-normal variety. Alternatively,
one could suspect dependence between the individual effects and covariates. In this case,
a fixed effects Poisson model is available. We will see in the application that the pooled
Poisson model and the panel Poisson models provide quite similar effect estimates. Finally,
the single index structure of the Poisson regression model (and its generalizations above)
implies that once the mean is given all other aspects of the distribution are determined
as well. In particular, the reform cannot have different effects in different parts of the
distribution (relative to the Poisson probability function).
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5.2 Structural models
Historically, the most important generalization of the single index structure is the hurdle
model (Mullahy, 1986). The hurdle model combines a binary model for the decision of use
with a truncated-at-one count data model for the extent of use given use. Define di = 1 if
a person does not see a doctor in a given period, i.e., di = 1 − min(1, y). The probability
function is then given by
f(yi) = f
di
1i [(1− f1i)fT (yi|yi > 0)]1−di (4)
where f1i = P (di = 1), fT (yi|yi > 0) = f2(yi)/[1− f2i(0)], and independence between hurdle
and positive part is assumed. Estimation is simple, since the log-likelihood factors into two
parts
lnL =
∑
i
di ln f1i + (1− di) ln(1− f1i) +
∑
di=0
ln f2(yi)− ln(1− f2i(0))
To close the model, one needs to specify f1 and f2. Choices for the hurdle function f1 include:
• exp(− exp(x′iγ)) (Poisson)
• [1 + θ]− exp(x′iγ)/θ (negative binomial, type 1)
• [α/(exp(x′iγ) + α)]α (negative binomial, type 2)
• exp(x′iγ)/(1 + exp(x′iγ)) (logit)
• Φ(x′iγ) (probit)
Choices for f2 include:
• Poisson
• negative binomial
• Poisson log-normal
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The first four hurdle expressions for f1 possess the advantage that, if combined with
the appropriate distribution for f2, the hurdle model nests the base model. The probit
assumption for the hurdle has the advantage that it can be easily generalized to a model
with correlated hurdle, as shown below.
The hurdle model has been popular in the health literature, partially because it can be
given a structural interpretation that seems to agree well with the intuition of a dual decision
structure of the demand process. The first contact decision is made independently by the
patient, whereas the treatment and referral decision is influenced by the physician. Right-
fully, Deb and Trivedi (2002, p.602) note that “in modeling the usage of medical services, the
two-part model ( i.e. hurdle model, my insertion) has served as a methodological cornerstone
of empirical analysis.”
Deb and Trivedi then point out a potential incongruence between model assumptions and
data situation: medical consultations are measured per period and not per illness episode.
Moreover, healthy individuals consult physicians as well. As an alternative to the hurdle
model, Deb and Trivedi advocate a finite mixture model in order to discriminate between
frequent and less frequent users. Such a model can, for instance, capture unobserved dif-
ferences with respect to the long-run state of health that affect constant as well as slope
coefficients of the index function. For instance, let
f(yi|θ) =
s∑
j=1
pijfj(yi|θj) (5)
where fj is a Poisson- or negative binomial distribution, pi1 + . . . , pis = 1, and 0 < pij < 1.
For s = 2, the model has the same number of parameters as the hurdle model, and the two
can be compared directly. Deb and Trivedi (2002, p. 601) find in a study based on data from
the RAND Health Insurance Experiment “strong evidence in favor of a latent class model.”
Santos Silva and Windmeijer (2001) by contrast propose a model of the form
Y = R1 +R2 + . . .+RS =
S∑
i=j
Rj
where Y is the total number of visits, R is the number of contacts per episode, and S is the
number of episodes. This model thus accommodates a situation where more than one illness
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episode is possible within the observation period, and the number of visits per episode is a
random variable with support 1, 2, 3, . . ..
If S = 0, 1, 2, . . . is Poisson distributed with mean E(Si|xi) = exp(x′iβ), and Rj = 1, 2, . . .
are identically and independently logarithmic distributed with mean
E(Rij|xi) = exp(x
′
iγ)
ln[1 + exp(x′iγ)]
then one can show that Y is negative binomial distributed with
f(yi|xi) =
Γ
(
yi +
exp(x′iβ+x
′
iγ)
ln[1+exp(x′iγ)]
)
exp(− exp(x′iβ))
Γ(yi + 1)Γ
(
exp(x′iβ+x
′
iγ)
ln[1+exp(x′iγ)]
)
(1 + exp(−x′iγ))yi
(6)
and
E(Yi|xi) = exp(x
′
iβ + x
′
iγ)
ln[1 + exp(x′iγ)]
.
5.3 An alternative hurdle model
It can be argued that the recent debate on the relative merits of two-part, mixture and mul-
tiple spell models takes too narrow a view by concentrating on modified negative binomial
models. The negative binomial model has the attractive feature of a closed form probability
function. And yet, it is frequently found that the Poisson-log normal model (which can be
derived assuming a Poisson model with unobserved heterogeneity in the linear predictor that
has a normal distribution, whereas the negative binomial model assumes a log gamma dis-
tribution) provides a better fit, although the computation of probabilities requires numerical
quadrature.
With ever decreasing computational costs, the lack of a closed form probability function
becomes less of a problem, and it may be worthwhile to explore a hurdle model based on
the Poisson-log normal model. Thus, I propose to combine a probit model for the hurdle
with a truncated Poisson-log-normal model for strictly positive outcomes. Let zi be a latent
indicator variable such that
zi = x
′
iγ + εi
12
and
yi = 0 iff zi ≥ 0 .
Moreover, for the positive part of the distribution
yi|yi > 0 ∼ truncated Poisson(λi)
where
λi = exp(x
′
iβ + ui)
The model is completed by assuming that εi and ui are independently normally distributed
with variance 1 and σ2, respectively. Thus, the individual likelihood contribution of the
probit-Poisson-log-normal model is
f(yi) = Φ(x
′
iγ)
di ×
[
(1− Φ(x′iγ))
∫ ∞
−∞
exp(−λi(ui))(λi(ui))yi
[1− exp(−λi(ui))]yi! g(ui)dui
]1−di
(7)
where g(ui) is the standard normal density and di = 1−min(1, y) as before. The likelihood
can be evaluated using Gauss-Hermite integration.
One could take things one step further and let εi and ui be bivariate normal distributed
with covariance ρσ to obtain a model that might be referred to as a probit-Poisson-log-normal
model with correlated errors. This is an appealing possibility, since it relaxes the assumption
of conditional independence between the hurdle step and the distribution model for strictly
positive outcomes. This assumption is violated if common unobservables affect both parts
of the model. Moreover, this generalization is easily integrated within the current modeling
framework. In particular, εi|ui ∼ N(ρui/σ, 1− ρ2) and
P (yi = 0|ui) = P (εi ≥ −x′iγ|ui) = Φ
(
x′iγ + ρui/σ√
1− ρ2
)
= Φ∗i (ui)
Thus one obtains
f(yi|ui) = Φ∗i (ui)di ×
[
(1− Φ∗i (ui))
exp(−λi(ui))(λi(ui))yi
[1− exp(−λi(ui))]yi!
]1−di
(8)
and
f(yi) =
∫ ∞
−∞
f(yi|ui)g(ui)dui (9)
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The correlation should be negative (due to the likely presence of common unobserved factors).
To give an example, for individuals with a (latent) dislike of physicians, P (no use) is high
while E(y|use) is low.
While this model is relatively easy to implement, there are a number of problems that
may limit its usefulness in practice. One problem is identification. Although the parameter
is formally identified, results of Smith and Moffatt (1999) suggest that it may not be possible
to identify the correlation parameter with enough precision in practice. Hence, this model is
not necessarily an improvement on a model that assumes independence. In fact, I found in
the following application that the correlation coefficient was insignificant despite the large
sample size.
A second issue concerns the interpretation of the results. Selection models of this sort
are interesting, because they can identify the parameters of a latent demand function, in the
present context the latent demand for doctor visits for those who do not visit the doctor at
all. The meaning of such a demand is difficult to define which renders this latent demand
of limited interest. As a consequence, I decided to report estimates from the restricted
probit-Poisson-log-normal model without correlated errors only.
5.4 Reform effect in the different models
The ultimate goal of this paper is the evaluation of the reform effect, namely the ceteris
paribus change in the distribution of doctor visits between 1996 and 1998. The appropriate
formula for the Poisson model was already given in (3). Identical computations apply for
the negative binomial and Poisson-log-normal models. In all cases, the reform effect can be
summarized by the ceteris paribus change in the conditional expectation function. Moreover,
due to the log-linear conditional expectation the proportional effect is independent of the
values taken by other independent variables. Since the employed models are fully parametric,
other aspects of the distribution can be studied as well, such as the effect of the reform on
single probabilities. This effect in general will depend on values taken by other regressors.
For the structural models, the reform effect is more complex. Even if one considers mean
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responses only, these can now be decomposed into distinct sources. In the hurdle model for
instance, the overall effect can be decomposed into an effect for the hurdle and an effect
for positive counts. These two effects can complement or counteract each other. Similarly,
in the finite mixture model the reform may impact differently on the two groups. Finally,
in the multi-episode model, separate effects are identified for the number of spells and the
number of referrals.
Formally, the computations of the reform effect in the three models are as follows:
1. Hurdle model
E(y98)
E(y96)
− 1 = P (y98 > 0)
P (y96 > 0)
E(y98|y98 > 0)
E(y96|y96 > 0) − 1
= (1 + ∆P (Y >0))(1 + ∆E(Y |Y >0))− 1
2. Finite mixture model
E(y98|group = j)
E(y96|group = j) − 1 = exp(β
j
98 − βj96)− 1 , j = 1, 2
3. Multi-episode model
E(y98)
E(y96)
− 1 = E(S98)
E(S96)
E(R98)
E(R96)
− 1
= (1 + ∆E(S))(1 + ∆E(R))− 1
Except for the finite mixture model, the estimated effects will depend on the realized
values of the other independent variables. The computations in the following section evaluate
these effects at the sample means of the variables.
6 Results
Table 1 gives summary statistics for the variables involved in the analysis. The average
number of doctor visits per quarter declined from 2.66 to 2.35 between 1996 and 1998. This
is more than a 11 percent reduction in the number of quarterly visits. There was a 1 percent
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decline between 1995 and 1996, and a 2 percent increase between 1998 and 1999. Thus,
the large drop in the number of visits clearly coincides with the timing of the reform. Also,
the 1999 “counter” reform went hand in hand with an increased number of visits, again
consistent with the hypothesis of a behavioral effect.
Throughout the sample period, there is a large fraction of non-users. The proportion is
highest in 1998, when it reaches 37 percent of the sample, a 4.4 percentage point increase over
the pre-reform year 1996. A simple Poisson distribution with parameter equal to the sample
mean would predict a much lower proportion of non-users, e.g., 9.5 percent in 1998. Although
this comparison does not take into account the variation generated by the regressors, it
suggests the presence of extra-zeros in the data.
The average age increased by less than a year between 1995 and 1999. This is a reflection
of the fact that the panel is not balanced. One reason for this is that young people enter the
sample and old people leave since the sample is restricted to those aged 20-60 at any point
in time, in addition to attrition and non- response. The unemployment to population ratio
captures the state of the business cycle. Indeed, it closely traces the movement of the official
unemployment rate (see e.g. Sachversta¨ndigenrat 2000) that peaked at 11 percent in 1997
for former West Germany.
Finally, Table 1 also informs about the other health related variables used in the anal-
ysis. Interestingly, the statistics indicate a general improvement in the health status of the
population between 1996 and 1998. The proportion of people in active sports increased from
25 to 31 percent, although these averages are very volatile. A steadier trend is observed for
the self-reported health condition. The proportion of people reporting good health increased
from 56 to 60 percent, while the proportion of people reporting poor health decreased from
14 to 13 percent. These trends are important for two reasons. Firstly, improvements in the
perceived health might be able to explain part of the reduction in the number of doctor
visits, and one should control for that in order to isolate the reform effect. Secondly, these
improvements provide some evidence against the possibility that the reforms, while being
successful in containing costs, actually worsened the general health status. Of course, these
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self-reports are only a very crude measure of health, and more research would be needed to
study the long-term consequences of expenditure reductions in the health sector on public
health. This is beyond the scope of the current analysis.
The estimates for the basic Poisson model, with and without accounting for individual
specific effects, are displayed in Table 2. The first column shows the estimates from a pooled
Poisson model. The second column displays the result from a Poisson model with gamma
distributed random effects (i.e., a panel negative binomial model). The fixed effects Poisson
estimates are given in the third column. In this model, all time invariant regressors have
to be dropped, as well as all observations pertaining to individuals without variation in
the dependent count. Most effects are robust to the particular model specification, and
many of the results are common to those found elsewhere in the literature: men have less
doctor visits than women, and the expected number of doctor visits is u-shaped in age. The
health indicators have the largest effect among all variables although the effect is somewhat
attenuated in the panel models. Most importantly the coefficients on the year dummies
indicate that there was a statistically significant decline in the expected number o doctor
visits between 1996 and 1998 in all three model specifications. Based on the pooled Poisson
model, the expected number of visits fell by 9.9 percent.
Six additional models were estimated using the same data: negative binomial, Poisson-
log-normal, hurdle-negative binomial, finite mixture negative binomial with two components,
multi-episode model, and the probit-Poisson-log-normal model. The following discussion of
the models is guided by the following questions: Is the result found in the base Poisson
model robust with respect to model choice? Can the Deb and Trivedi (2002) conclusion of
the superiority of the finite mixture model over the hurdle model be confirmed? And to
what extent can one uncover asymmetries in the responses to the reform in different parts
of the distribution (i.e., attribute the mean effect to different sources)?
There are several ways to discriminate between the models. Some of the models are
nested (such as the Poisson and the negative binomial model), most of them are not (such
as the finite mixture, the hurdle negative binomial and the multi- episodes models). Table 3
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shows the log-likelihood values of the different models. Likelihood ratio tests clearly reject
the Poisson model against the alternative models with unobserved heterogeneity. To pick
the best model among all seven, a comparison of the simple likelihoods is a first indicator.
One can compute for instance the average probability that the model has generated the data,
denoted here as S.
However, both the log-likelihood and the S statistics do not account for the fact that the
number of parameters differ across the estimated models. Hence, the Schwarz Information
Criterion (SIC) is included as well. The selection result stays the same regardless of what
criterion is chosen. The new model with probit hurdle and log-normal unobserved hetero-
geneity offers a substantial improvement over all other models. One should also point out
that the results corroborate the Deb and Trivedi (2002) conclusion that the finite mixture
negative binomial model outperforms the hurdle negative binomial model. Thus their result
has to be interpreted as evidence against the particular hurdle parameterization, and not
against hurdle models in general.
To analyze the particular relationship between the two hurdle models, the finite mixture
model, and the multi-episode model more formally, one can use Vuong’s (1989) test for model
selection among non-nested models. This test does not require any of the two models to be
correctly specified, but rather picks the model that is closer to the true distribution. The test
is directional and symmetric. Under the null-hypothesis that the two models are equivalent,
the test statistic∑N
i=1 log f(yi|xi)− log g(yi|xi)√∑N
i=1 (log f(yi|xi)− log g(yi|xi))2
is standard normally distributed. Note that the numerator is nothing else than the log of
the likelihood ratio. To implement the test, one chooses a critical value c from the standard
normal distribution. If the value of the statistic is greater than c, one rejects the null
hypothesis of equivalence against the alternative that model f is better than model g. If the
test statistic is smaller than −c, g is better than f . The test statistic for the probit Poisson
log normal against the finite mixture model is 5.7, against the hurdle negative binomial model
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13.7, and against the multi-episodes model 12.1. Hence, the null hypothesis is rejected in
all three cases in favor of the new model. A comparison of finite mixture and hurdle models
has a test-statistic of 5.7.
Table 4 reports the parameter estimates for the probit Poisson-log-normal model. The
first column gives the coefficients for the hurdle part, the second for the positive part. Due
to the parameterization of the model (the hurdle is parameterized for the event of no visit),
the coefficients should normally be of opposite sign, implying that the effect of a variable
on the probability of use and on the extent of use, given use, go in the same direction. The
sign and magnitude of the effects is determined by the data and not imposed a-priori. The
“sign-test” indeed shows only one deviation, in the case of the variable “education”. For the
variable ”active sport”, the impact on the probability of non-use is statistically significant
but the impact on the positives is insignificant.
The size and composition of the reform effect, measured by the percentage reduction in
the expected number of doctor visits, for each of the models under consideration is listed in
Table 5. The estimates for the base model, with or without unobserved heterogeneity, are
all in the same range, varying between 9.9 to 10.4 percent. These estimates are substantially
above those of the Lauterbach et al. study who reported a decline of 4.5 percent. How can
these two findings be reconciled? It is possible that the differences have to do with the low
response rate in their survey, or the way the question was posed that differs from the GSOEP
approach. The analysis of this paper suggests, however, a more fundamental reason, namely
the fact that the Cologne study sampled individuals on-site and thus overrepresented heavy
users. If it is the case that heavy users have a lower demand elasticity than occasional users,
the two findings can be reconciled.
The structural models estimated above can exactly deal with this question of different
elasticities in different parts of the distribution. Table 5 confirms that such a differential
effect is present indeed. This is most obvious from the probit-Poisson-log-normal estimates.
The reduction is greatest at the left margin of the distribution: the probability of being
a user (at least one visit) decreased by an estimated 6.7 percent between 1996 and 1998,
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whereas the expected number of visits, conditional on use, decreased only by an estimated
2.6 percent. Compare this to the alternative of a single Poisson-log-normal model without
hurdle. In this case, the implied changes are -3.0 percent for P (Y > 0) and -6.1 percent for
E(Y |Y > 0), respectively. Hence, the evidence clearly suggests an excess sensitivity at the
left tail of the distribution.
This important result is confirmed by the other two structural models, although quan-
titative details differ. The finite mixture model separates the population into two groups.
Two-thirds of the population belong to a low user group with a mean number of quarterly
visits of 1.6, and one third belongs to a high user group with a mean number of 3 visits per
quarter. Consistent with the above argument, the low user group shows the larger response
to the reform with a 13 percent reduction. Similarly, in the multi-episode model, the effect
on the number of spells is much greater than the effect on the number of referrals (which
actually are estimated to have slightly increased by 1.3 percent). In each case, the two effects
add up to a combined effect in the neighborhood of a 10 percent reduction in the number of
visits between 1996 and 1998.
7 Discussion
The analysis showed that the German health care reform of 1997 affected the left tail much
more than the positive part of the distribution of the number of doctor visits. To the
extent that the positive part represents the subpopulation of the seriously or chronically
ill, whereas the left end of the distribution represents the healthy, this might have been an
intended consequence of the reforms.
How reasonable is it to interpret the uncovered reform effects as causal? Identification is
achieved by studying variation in the demand for doctor visits over time. Thus, it is assumed
that other things didn’t change concurrently, beyond the individual socioeconomic charac-
teristics controlled for in the regression. It is hard to imagine what these other things should
have been. It is unlikely that the underlying unobserved health status varied substantially
between the two years beyond the controls, or that a health epidemic of major proportion
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hit in 1996 but was absent in 1998.
Even if one accepts the interpretation that the health care reform of 1997 was causally
responsible for reducing the subsequent number of visits, it is still an additional step to
attribute this effect to the increased co-payments. The reforms consisted of several measures,
the demand side policy of increased co-payments being one of them. A 1997 change that
affected the supply side was the introduction of a quarterly budget, which intended to affect
the physician’s treatment choices. While this system did provide incentives for reduced
treatment intensity, it also made it beneficial for a physician to see a patient at least once
each quarter. Thus, supply side arguments are in contradiction with the observed evidence
of a the large increase of the proportion of people with no visit at all, combined with a
relatively small reduction of repeated visits.
Certainly, future work needs to pursue these issues further. Such work can build on the
methodological insights of this paper. When studying the effects of reforms on the demand
for doctor visits, hurdle-, or two-part-models should be given serious consideration. Of
course, these models are only one possible way to generalize the rigid assumptions underlying
single index models such as the standard Poisson or negative binomial regressions. A very
promising alternative, quantile regression models for count data, is currently developed by
Machado and Santos Silva (2002).
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Table 1. Sample means of doctor visits and selected
socio-demographic characteristics, 1995-1999.
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Number of doctor visits 2.687 2.657 2.553 2.353 2.391
(relative change in %) (-1.1) (-3.9) (-7.8) (+1.6)
No doctor visits (0/1) 0.348 0.328 0.352 0.372 0.346
Age 38.08 38.20 38.47 38.73 38.92
Unemployed (0/1) 0.085 0.084 0.092 0.085 0.075
Active sport (0/1) 0.295 0.247 0.262 0.307 0.266
Good health (0/1) 0.568 0.562 0.581 0.595 0.580
Bad health (0/1) 0.145 0.138 0.134 0.127 0.129
Observations 6790 6555 6480 6781 6231
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP, N = 32837).
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Table 2. Poisson regression results
pooled random effects fixed effects
Age ×10−1 -0.1057 -0.0927
(0.0660) (0.0575)
Age2 ×10−3 0.1580 0.1885
(0.0801) (0.0700)
Male -0.2085 -0.2948
(0.0209) (0.0203)
Education×10−1 -0.0576 -0.0424
(0.0370) (0.0408)
Married 0.0808 0.0773 0.1036
(0.0223) (0.0181) (0.0251)
Household size -0.0522 -0.0555 -0.0599
(0.0078) (0.0060) (0.0085)
Active sport 0.0466 0.0061 -0.0102
(0.0193) (0.0126) (0.0142)
Good health -0.6109 -0.5014 -0.4300
(0.0190) (0.0118) (0.0128)
Bad health 0.8131 0.6225 0.5661
(0.0225) (0.0122) (0.0129)
Social assistance 0.0861 0.0405 0.0176
(0.0444) (0.0264) (0.0289)
Log(income) 0.0931 0.0174 -0.0166
(0.0229) (0.0160) (0.0192)
Year = 1996 0.0012 -0.0142 -0.0102
(0.0268) (0.0111) (0.0112)
Year = 1997 -0.0302 -0.0503 -0.0403
(0.0269) (0.0114) (0.0115)
Year = 1998 -0.1048 -0.1062 -0.0844
(0.0268) (0.0119) (0.0120)
Year = 1999 -0.0987 -0.1068 -0.0793
(0.0273) (0.0123) (0.0125)
Log likelihood -86566.18 -70176.7 -42738.86
Observations 32837 32837 29084
Source: GSOEP, own calculations. Model in addition includes three quarterly dummies and
indicators of employment status. Standard errors in parentheses (pooled model with robust
standard errors).
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Table 3. Model Selectiona
Log-Likelihood Parameter SICa Sb
Poisson -86,566.18 22 173,361.14 7.16
Unobserved heterogeneity:
Negative binomial -64,611.55 23 129,462.28 13.97
Poisson-Log-Normal -64,202.78 23 128,644.74 14.15
Hurdle models:
Hurdle negative binomialc -64,252.16 46 128,982.68 14.13
Probit-Poisson-log-normal -63,871.90 45 128,211.78 14.30
Finite mixture model:
2-components negative binomial -64,020.05 47 128,528.87 14.23
Multi episodes model:
Poisson-logarithmic -64,246.58 44 128,950.73 14.13
Notes:
a SIC = −2 lnL+K lnN
b S = exp(lnL/N)× 100
c Both hurdle and positive part are specified using the type 2 negative binomial probability
function.
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Table 4. Probit-Poisson-log-normal model
Probit (0/1+) Truncated Poisson-
log-normal (1+)
Age ×10−1 0.2734 -0.1100
(0.0559) (0.0557)
Age2 ×10−3 -0.3538 0.1458
(0.0688) (0.0675)
Male 0.4027 -0.1228
(0.0170) (0.0166)
Education×10−1 -0.1609 -0.1406
(0.0330) (0.0342)
Married -0.1394 0.0555
(0.0188) (0.0185)
Household size 0.0344 -0.0404
(0.0061) (0.0061)
Active sport -0.1429 0.0094
(0.0173) (0.0174)
Good health 0.4586 -0.4750
(0.0174) (0.0176)
Bad health -0.5720 0.6652
(0.0288) (0.0195)
Social assistance -0.0457 0.1279
(0.0413) (0.0413)
Log(income) -0.1293 0.0351
(0.0203) (0.0195)
Year = 1996 -0.0671 -0.0098
(0.0233) (0.0231)
Year = 1997 -0.0017 -0.0191
(0.0233) (0.0228)
Year = 1998 0.0595 -0.0450
(0.0230) (0.0237)
Year = 1999 -0.0092 -0.0746
(0.0236) (0.0229)
σ2 0.8015
(0.0066)
Log-Likelihood -19524.36 -44347.54
Observations 32837 21365
Model in addition includes three quarterly dummies and indicators of employment status.
Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 5. Evaluation of the reform effect
∆%(96,98)
Poisson model -9.9
Negative binomial -8.9
Poisson-log-normal -10.4
Two-components negative binomial
Group 1 (p1 = 0.663, µ1 = 1.59) -12.9
Group 2 (p2 = 0.337, µ2 = 3.01) -4.9
Total -10.2
Probit-Poisson-log-normal
Hurdle P (Y > 0) -6.7
Positives E(Y |Y > 0) -2.6
Total -9.1
Poisson-logarithmic(multi episodes)
Spells -10.2
Referrals +1.3
Total -9.1
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Appendix: The Data Set
The data are extracted from the German Socio-Economic Panel, 1995-1999. I use obser-
vations on men and women aged 20-60 from Sample A, i.e., persons associated with non-
Guestworker households in the original sample for West Germany. Privately insured indi-
viduals (about 6 percent of the sample) are excluded from the analysis. Accounting for
observations with missing values on any of the dependent or independent variables, the final
sample comprises 32837 observations.
Definition of Variables
Doctor consultations is the self-reported number of visits to a doctor during the three months
prior to the interview.
Male is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the individual is male.
Education is educational levels, measured in years of schooling.
Married is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the individual is married.
Householdsize is the number of persons living in the household.
Active sport is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the individual participates in
sports at least once a week.
Good health is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the individual classifies its own
health as either “very good” or “good”.
Bad health is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the individual classifies its own
health as either “very bad” or “bad” (“fair” is the omitted reference category).
Fulltime employed is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the individual is in
fulltime employment at the time of the interview.
Parttime employed is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the individual is in
parttime employment at the time of the interview.
Unemployed is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the individual is in unemployed
at the time of the interview.
Log(income) is the logarithmic household equivalent income, where the OECD scale has
been applied (weight of one for the first person, 0.7 for the second person, and 0.5 for each
additional person). Income is expressed in 1995 values using the CPI deflator published by
the Sachversta¨ndigenrat (2000).
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